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Abstract: This paper examines the impact of an emissions trading scheme (ETS) on
equilibrium emissions, output, price, market concentration, and profits in a generalized
Cournot model. We develop formulae for the number of emissions permits that have to
be freely allocated to firms to neutralize the profit impact of the ETS. We show that its
profit impact is usually limited: in a Cournot oligopoly with constant marginal costs,
total industry profits are preserved so long as freely allocated permits cover a fraction
of initial emissions that does not exceed the industry’s Herfindahl index.
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1. Introduction
There is increasingly broad recognition that greenhouse gas emissions are contributing to
changes to Earth’s climate. Emissions trading schemes for CO2 and other greenhouse gases
are an important part of the policy response to this problem. The justification for the use
of economic instruments, such as emissions trading and emissions taxes, arises from the
observation that imposing a common price on emissions equalizes marginal abatement costs
across polluting firms and minimizes the aggregate cost of pollution control (see Baumol and
Oates, 1988). In most cases, this makes economic instruments more efficient than “command-
and-control” intervention which specifies input or output standards or technologies. However,
there is a significant disadvantage to the use of taxes or trading: inframarginal wealth
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(john.quah@economics.ox.ac.uk), and Faculty of Economics and Electricity Policy Research Group, Cam-
bridge University (rar36@cam.ac.uk).
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transfers in the form of payments of taxes or for emissions permits impose an additional
burden on industry. The extent to which this burden can be alleviated affects the magnitude
of emissions reductions that are politically feasible.
Policy makers have sought to alleviate this problem by implementing trading schemes
where all or some of the emissions permits are granted for free. This is often referred to
as grandfathering since the number of permits freely allocated to a firm is typically related
to its past emissions. Grandfathering relieves the financial burden of the ETS on industry,
without affecting firms’ incentives to reduce emissions at the margin.2
For most emissions trading schemes in the US, and also in the early phases of the Eu-
ropean Union’s ETS for CO2 (EU ETS), almost all permits were freely allocated in this
manner. It is clear that not selling permits (at auction, say) entails a significant loss of
government revenue which could potentially be more productively employed in other ways
(for example, in the reduction of distortionary taxes).3 Furthermore, a firm’s incentive to
raise prices in response to the higher marginal cost is also unaffected by the free allocation of
permits. This raises the possibility that firms will make “windfall profits” from free permit
allocations. For these reasons and others, the question of whether to freely allocate permits,
and if so, to what extent, is an important one.
Model setup and ETS impact on emissions. The aim of this paper is to provide a
basic theoretical framework in which the profit impact and other central issues relating to
an ETS can be analyzed. We assume that the industry affected by the ETS is an oligopoly
in its product market. The industry’s conduct parameter θ governs the strategic interaction
within the industry, with θ = 1 corresponding to a Cournot oligopoly, θ = 0 corresponding to
perfect competition, and higher values of θ implying more collusive behavior. The production
process gives rise to emissions, which have to be paid for with emissions permits; firms are
price-takers in the market for permits. This is a reasonable setup, since we have in mind
a trading scheme, like the EU ETS, where permits are traded across many industries in
2 Another method of protecting average profits in an industry is to hold an auction for emissions permits
but to then return the revenue back to the firms using some other formula. This was originally proposed by
Hahn and Noll (1982); a small fraction of the permits in the Sulfur Allowance Program is allocated through
a zero-revenue auction (see Tietenberg (2006, Chapter 6)).
3 See, e.g., Fullerton and Metcalf (2001), Bovenberg and Goulder (2001), and Bovenberg, Goulder and
Gurney (2005).
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(potentially) many countries, so that firms are price takers in the market for permits, while
individual industries have oligopolistic structures.
Before we examine the issue of permit allocations, several more basic questions need to
be answered. Most importantly, does the imposition of a price on emissions have the desired
effect of reducing emissions in this industry? This effect, however intuitive, is not guaranteed
in an oligopoly model. We show that two added conditions on the model guarantee that the
ETS has the effect of reducing industry output, reducing firms’ average emissions intensity—
and hence also reducing total emissions: (a) firms’ marginal costs are non-negatively cor-
related with their emissions intensities,4 and (b) the industry faces a log-concave demand
function.5
The imposition of a price on emissions will always encourage firms to engage in abatement,
thus (weakly) lowering each firm’s emissions intensity. But the ETS also changes firms’
output decisions, so that the industry’s average emissions intensity can increase if dirtier
firms gain market share. We show that this possibility is excluded by conditions (a) and
(b), which together have two important effects. First, firms with lower marginal costs gain
market share and, since these are the bigger firms in the industry to begin with, market
concentration in the industry rises. Second, since (b) guarantees that these firms are not
more emissions intensive, the industry’s average emissions intensity and total emissions both
decline.
ETS impact on profits. The gain in market share of lower-cost firms means that the ETS
has the effect of moving the industry closer to the joint profit-maximizing (fully collusive)
outcome. This is one reason why the adverse profit impact (averaged across the whole
industry) of the ETS tends to be limited. We measure the profit impact by looking at
the profit-neutral permit allocation (PNA): the number of permits that have to be freely
allocated to the industry to guarantee that aggregate industry profit is preserved at its level
from before introduction of the ETS. Our framework yields bounds on this number without
4 Emissions intensity is defined as emissions per unit of output. Note that condition (a) is consistent
with notions of eco-efficiency (see Section 3 for more discussion). It is also satisfied if firms do not differ
significantly in their emissions intensities.
5 Log-concavity is a commonly-made restriction on the demand function; it is a sufficient (and, in a
certain sense, necessary) condition for a Cournot oligopoly to be a game of strategic substitutes (see Section
3 for more discussion).
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requiring a fully-specified parametric model. In particular, consider a Cournot oligopoly
with constant marginal costs and satisfying conditions (a) and (b). We show that if x is the
number of permits required to cover the industry’s pre-ETS emissions (had the permits been
needed), then the profit-neutral permit allocation is below Hx, where H is the Herfindahl
index (see case [4], Section 4.2). This bound becomes more (less) stringent if the industry
is more (less) competitive than Cournot (equivalently, if the conduct parameter θ ≤ (>) 1).
Even in relatively concentrated industries, the Herfindahl index is often much lower than
0.5. For example, consider a Cournot oligopoly with a Herfindahl index of 0.4, and suppose
the ETS targets a 20% reduction in emissions. In this case, the number of emissions permits
required for profit-neutrality, as a fraction of the number of issued permits, is 0.4/0.8 or 50%.
In other words, about half the number of permits can be auctioned whilst preserving total
industry profit. If instead the industry’s Herfindahl index is 0.20, the required proportion of
free permits falls to 25%.
Our results on profit-neutral permit allocations are obtained by developing formulae that
bound the level of profit-neutral permit allocations at the firm- and industry-level. These
formulae involve familiar parameters that can often be estimated with a reasonable degree
of accuracy, making them amenable to empirical implementation. We illustrate this by
applying them to calculate the profit-neutral permit allocation in the UK cement industry
(which is included in the EU ETS). This application also shows that profit-neutral permit
allocations can remain low even if we depart significantly from assumptions (a) and (b).
Related literature. Bovenberg, Goulder and Gurney (2005) (see also Bovenberg and
Goulder (2001)) build a competitive general equilibrium model in which capital is imperfectly
mobile, so that investment in sectors affected by an ETS will have a lower rate of return.
Capital in these sectors could be compensated with free permits, which in turn has an
economy-wide efficiency cost (because, for instance, of the foregone opportunity to reduce
distortionary taxes). They consider a scheme to control SO2 emissions in the U.S. and show
that the efficiency cost of compensation policies is limited, mainly because the extent of free
permit allocations needed to maintain equity returns is low (no more than 50% of issued
permits). Their model assumes that all sectors of the economy (including those affected by
the ETS) are perfectly competitive, so the qualitative features of their analysis are related
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to our analysis of the perfectly competitive case (see case [1], Section 4.2).
This paper does not consider various other interesting issues relating to emissions trading,
including some that may have an impact on profit-neutral permit allocations.6 Among our
main assumptions is that firms are price takers in the market for permits. This will be
violated in situations where the permits market is not significantly broader than the product
market; Hahn (1984) and Liski and Montero (2006) consider market power in the emissions
market, motivated by the markets for acid rain and particulates.7 The allocation process can
also lead to rent-seeking behavior among firms; for an account of this process in the case of
the Acid Rain Program, see Joskow and Schmalensee (1998). It has also been argued that the
incentive for technological innovation in emissions abatement is dependent on grandfathering.
Some of these issues are surveyed by Cramton and Kerr (2002) who also discuss alternative
methods for auctioning permits.
Organization of the paper. Section 2 analyzes the impact of the ETS in a monopoly.
It also discusses some general principles underlying profit-neutral permit allocations, and
why its level in an oligopoly may differ markedly from its level in a monopoly. Section 3
examines the impact of an ETS in a generalized Cournot model on industry output, market
concentration, and emissions. In Section 4 we present our results on profit-neutral permit
allocations at the firm- and industry-level. Section 5 applies our formulae to estimate profit-
neutral permit allocations in the UK cement industry. Section 6 concludes.
2. The impact of the ETS on firm profits
This section provides a preliminary analysis of the impact of the emissions trading scheme
(ETS) on firm profits and of the level of free permit allocations needed to maintain profits at
the pre-ETS level. We consider an industry that produces emissions (e.g., of carbon dioxide)
that is harmful to the environment. The ETS imposes a cost on these emissions. We assume
that the industry is one of many covered by the scheme, so that, although firms have market
power in their product market, they are price-takers in the permit market. In this section,
6 See also Tietenberg (2006) for a careful summary of these points.
7 Clearly, the presence of transaction costs also means that initial permit allocations have strategic
consequences (Stavins, 1995), although there is some evidence of transaction costs being low in the US sulfur
dioxide scheme (see Joskow, Schmalensee, and Bailey, 1998).
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we make no substantive assumptions regarding the nature of the strategic interaction in the
industry. We begin by considering the case of a monopoly. Although not typical, this case
has the merit of having a completely general solution and it provides a natural setting to
introduce some of the main concepts in our paper.
2.1. The monopoly case
We assume that the monopolist chooses a production plan that maximizes its profit, given
the demand for its output (which may consist of one or several distinct products), its pro-
duction set, input prices, and the emissions permit price t ≥ 0. We denote the monopolist’s
(maximum) profit by Π∗(t), and the associated level of emissions by ζ∗(t). Assuming that
one permit is required for each unit of emissions, the profit before accounting for the cost of
permits is Π∗(t) = Π∗(t) + tζ∗(t). (Note that Π∗(0) = Π∗(0).)
The situation before the introduction of the ETS corresponds to the case where t = 0,
i.e., emissions are unpriced. Therefore, Π∗(0) and ζ∗(0) are the monopolist’s initial levels of
profits and emissions respectively. Profit maximization by the monopolist guarantees that,
at any t > 0,
Π∗(t) ≤ Π∗(0) = Π∗(0) and (1)
Π∗(t) = Π∗(t)− tζ∗(t) ≥ Π∗(0)− tζ∗(0). (2)
Equation (1) follows from the fact that Π∗ is the optimal profit at t = 0, while the production
decision that generates a profit of Π∗(t) is one that the monopolist could have made at t = 0,
so the latter must be smaller than the former. The right-hand side of (2) is the monopolist’s
profit if it chooses not to adjust production after the introduction of the ETS—this must be
less than Π∗(t), which is the optimal profit when emissions are priced at t.
Combining (1) and (2) yields two conclusions. First, the introduction of the ETS reduces
emissions, since these inequalities only hold simultaneously if ζ∗(t) ≤ ζ∗(0). Second, the
ETS reduces the monopolist’s profit, since (1) implies that Π∗(t) = Π∗(t)− tζ∗(t) ≤ Π∗(0).
Consider now the level of free allocation of permits required to compensate the monopolist
for the reduction in profits from Π∗(0) to Π∗(t). From (2), Π∗(t) + tζ∗(0) ≥ Π∗(0), and
furthermore Π∗(t) ≤ Π∗(0), so there is a 0 ≤ γ(t) ≤ 1 such that
Π∗(t) + t [γ(t)ζ∗(0)] = Π∗(0). (3)
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In other words, γ(t)ζ∗(0) is the number of freely allocated permits—the profit-neutral al-
location (PNA)—that will leave the monopolist’s total profits at the pre-ETS level. Since
γ(t) ≤ 1, PNA is a fraction of the firm’s initial emissions. In this case we say that the
profit-neutral allocation is partial.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Suppose that the introduction of the ETS is
accompanied by a free allocation of permits at the monopolist’s original level of emissions;
furthermore, suppose that the monopolist chooses not to adjust its production plan in re-
sponse to the introduction of the ETS. Then the increase in her costs would be exactly offset
by the value of the free allowances. However, the option to adjust (e.g., increase price(s) or
switch to cleaner inputs) means that the PNA, in general, is partial. It is worth emphasizing
that this conclusion is very robust: no restrictions are imposed on the monopolist, except
that it is a price-taker in the market for emissions permits.8
Finally, suppose that the monopolist indeed receives the PNA of γ(t)ζ∗(0) permits for
free. Re-writing (3), we obtain that Π∗(t)+ t [γ(t)ζ∗(0)− ζ∗(t)] = Π∗(0). This, together with
(1), implies that the monopolist’s endowed permits under the PNA, γ(t)ζ∗(0), will exceed
its requirement ζ∗(t), so the monopolist will be selling part of its endowment.
The following proposition summarizes our analysis of the monopoly case.
Proposition 1. Following the introduction of the ETS, a monopolist has lower emissions
and lower profit. PNA is partial, i.e., 0 ≤ γ(t) ≤ 1; with this allocation of permits the
monopolist is a net supplier in the market for permits.
2.2. Partial PNA in an oligopoly
When considering an oligopoly, we can no longer rely solely on the revealed preference
arguments that gave us such mileage in the monopoly case. Nevertheless, we can still derive
some general results which show that PNA in an oligopoly can be very different from that
in a monopoly.
Assume that there are N ≥ 2 firms in an industry that interact with each other strategi-
cally; we leave the precise manner of their strategic interaction unspecified for now. Retaining
8 Furthermore, it is clear that the result holds even if the monopolist is subject to certain regulatory
restrictions, such as being prevented from raising prices after the introduction of the ETS.
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our earlier notation, we denote equilibrium industry profits when the permit price is t by
Π∗(t), the equilibrium (total) emissions by ζ∗(t), and so on. The corresponding outcomes
for firm i are Π∗i (t), ζ
∗
i (t), etc. We assume that these are all smooth functions of the permit
price t in some interval [0, T ], where T > 0. We call this model a smooth oligopoly.
As in the monopoly case, the proportion of free permit allocation needed for profit-
neutrality at the industry-level, γ(t), is given by (3). The next result gives a sufficient
condition for strictly partial PNA.
Proposition 2. Suppose ζ∗(t) < ζ∗(0) and Π∗(t) ≥ Π∗(0). Then PNA is strictly partial,
i.e., γ(t) < 1; with this level of free allocation, the industry has a net demand for permits.
Proof: Given the assumptions, there is a γ(t) < 1 such that
Π∗(t)− Π∗(0) + t [γ(t)ζ∗(0)− ζ∗(t)] = 0.
Rearranging this expression and using the fact that Π∗(t) − tζ∗(t) = Π∗(t), we obtain (3).
Since Π∗(t) ≥ Π∗(0), we must have γ(t)ζ∗(0)− ζ∗(t) ≤ 0, so the industry has a net demand
for permits. QED
Proposition 2 says that the industry PNA is strictly partial if the introduction of an
ETS increases industry profits before accounting for emissions costs—in other words, if the
ETS leads to a “more collusive” equilibrium outcome. Specifically, had the firms in the
industry chosen the (same) actions they did upon the introduction of the ETS before it was
introduced, their total profits (at Π∗(t)) would have exceeded Π∗(0)). Of course this scenario
is impossible for a profit-maximizing monopolist (see (1)), but it can certainly occur in an
oligopoly.9
Proposition 2 has a partial converse. Taking the Taylor expansion of Π∗(t) around t = 0,
(3) tells us that the first-order approximation
γ˜ ≡ lim
t→0
γ(t) = − 1
ζ∗(0)
dΠ∗
dt
(0). (4)
Since, by definition, Π∗(t) = Π∗(t)− ζ∗(t)t, we can also write
γ˜ = 1− 1
ζ∗(0)
dΠ∗
dt
(0), (5)
9 For example, in the standard textbook case of symmetric Cournot oligopoly with constant marginal
cost, industry profits are lower than for a monopolist. If the ETS leads to lower industry output that is
closer to the monopoly level, then PNA is strictly partial.
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from which the next proposition follows immediately.
Proposition 3. In a smooth oligopoly,
γ˜ < 1⇐⇒ dΠ
∗
dt
(0) > 0. (6)
We make two other important observations regarding γ˜.
(1) If γ˜ < 1, then for small t, γ(t) < 1. The industry’s net demand for permits, assuming
it is given this level of free allocation, is ζ∗(t) − γ(t)ζ∗(0). Since limt→0 ζ∗(t) = ζ∗(0), for
low values of t, ζ∗(t) − γ(t)ζ∗(0) > 0. In other words, if γ˜ < 1, then (for small values
of t) PNA is strictly partial and the industry’s net demand for permits will be positive. If
there are sufficiently many industries covered by the ETS with γ˜ < 1, then overall net
demand for permits will be positive. It follows that the permit price can only be supported
if there is an external party—the government—that meets this net demand. In this case,
an emissions trading scheme will raise net revenue for government even if industries receive
their profit-neutral permit allocations.
(2) Recall that if the industry is a monopoly then, for all t > 0, γ(t) ≤ 1, but the
monopoly is also a net supplier of permits. Comparing this with our previous observation,
we conclude that, for a monopoly, γ˜ = 1; so even though PNA is (weakly) partial for a
monopoly it approaches a full allocation of permits for low permit prices.10
Our discussion already highlights an important distinction between PNA for a monopoly
and for an oligopoly. While PNA for a monopolist is so high that allocation at that level
will render it a net supplier of permits, PNA for an oligopoly can be significantly lower.
This is because an equilibrium oligopoly outcome does not typically maximize the firms’
joint profits. This means that an ETS could have the effect of leading to a “more collusive”
equilibrium outcome (in the sense of raising Π); if it does, PNA will be partial.
In an industry producing a homogeneous good, the oligopoly’s equilibrium outcome will
typically depart from joint profit-maximization in two ways: (i) output is higher (and price
is lower) than it should be, and (ii) production is not divided in a cost-efficient way across
10 An alternative way of showing that γ˜ = 1 for a monopolist is to observe that, by the envelope theorem,
dΠ∗/dt = −ζ∗ and then to apply formula (4) for t = 0. Notice also that d2Π∗/dt2 = −dζ∗/dt ≥ 0 since ζ∗(t)
is decreasing in t. In other words, the profit function Π∗(t) is convex in t, so γ(t) = [Π(0)−Π(t)] /tζ∗(0) is
decreasing in t. (This property does not generally extend to oligopoly; see Section 4.3 for related discussion.)
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firms. The next section will, amongst other things, examine the conditions under which
these “problems” can be ameliorated by an ETS, with the effect that PNA is not just partial
but significantly below 100%.
3. The ETS in a generalized Cournot model
Consider an oligopoly with N ≥ 2 firms producing a homogeneous product. We shall treat
emissions like any other input of the firm, so its level is chosen optimally (see, e.g., Baumol
and Oates, 1988). To be specific, given the price of emissions and the prices of all other
inputs (which we assume are fixed) the firm chooses the emissions level and the bundle of
other inputs that minimizes the cost of producing any given output level. We denote the
price of emissions by t and assume that it takes values over some relevant range [0, T ]. The
(minimum) cost incurred by firm i when it produces qi, given an emissions price t, is denoted
by Ci(qi, t).
Model specification on cost functions and emissions intensities. The assumption
that firms’ production functions have constant returns to scale, so that Ci is a linear function
of qi, is a natural benchmark for a theoretical analysis of an oligopoly model. We will rely
on a more general class of cost functions which includes the constant-returns case but also
allows for increasing marginal costs of a particular form. We assume that
Ci(qi, t) = ci(t)qi +
1
2
mq2i . (7)
Therefore, firm i’s marginal cost Mi is an affine function of output
Mi(qi, t) ≡ ∂Ci
∂qi
(qi, t) = ci(t) +mqi. (8)
Note that, by assumption, m ≥ 0 is the same for all firms in the industry and is independent
of t. When m = 0, firms’ have constant—but possibly asymmetric—marginal costs, while a
positive m corresponds to increasing marginal cost.
By Shephard’s Lemma, the optimal (i.e., cost-minimizing) emissions level at output qi
and permit price t, ζi(qi, t), satisfies
ζi(qi, t) =
∂Ci
∂t
(qi, t) = c
′
i(t)qi. (9)
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Therefore, the firm’s emissions are linear in output and one can speak unambiguously of
the firm’s emissions intensity (i.e., emissions per unit of output, ζi/qi) at price t, which is
zi(t) = c
′
i(t). Combining (8) and (9) we obtain
∂Mi
∂t
(qi, t) = zi(t), (10)
so the increase in firm i’s marginal cost from a small increase in the emissions price is equal
to its emissions intensity.
Model specification on strategic interaction. We denote by q the vector (qi)1≤i≤N
representing the output of each firm. Aggregate output is denoted by Q and the output of
all firms except firm i by Q−i. We assume that the outcome in this industry at the emissions
price t ∈ [0, T ] corresponds to a conjectural variations equilibrium with each firm having the
conduct parameter θ ≥ 0. We denote the equilibrium output vector by q∗(t) = {q∗i (t)}1≤i≤N
and equilibrium aggregate output by Q∗(t) =
∑N
i=1 q
∗
i (t). By definition,
q∗i (t) ∈ argmaxqi≥0 {qiP (θ(qi − q∗i (t)) +Q∗(t))− Ci(qi, t)} , (11)
where P is the inverse demand function. In other words, firm i’s output choice of q∗i (t) is
profit-maximizing, given its belief that, should it deviate from this output to (say) qi, the
industry’s aggregate output will increase by θ(qi − q∗i (t)).
The standard Cournot-Nash equilibrium, where each firm takes its rivals’ output as given,
is nested, with θ = 1. More generally, lower values of θ represent more competitive behavior—
with perfect competition corresponding to θ = 0. We will usually be interested in cases where
industry conduct is weakly more competitive than the standard Cournot equilibrium, that
is θ ≤ 1. This is consistent with a significant amount of empirical evidence on firm conduct
across industries (see, e.g., Perloff, Karp and Golan (2007) for an overview), including many
industries that are natural candidates for an ETS such as airlines, cement, electricity, and
steel.11
11 Brander and Zhang (1990) find that US airlines’ competitive conduct is close to Cournot behavior (so
θ ≈ 1); they reject both perfect competition and collusion. Jans and Rosenbaum (1996) estimate conduct
parameters for US cement markets that lie between perfect competition and Cournot behavior—but are
usually close to perfect competition (so θ ' 0). Salvo (2010) finds that a Cournot model, augmented with a
price ceiling to capture the latent threat of competition from imports, captures the conduct of the Brazilian
cement sector. Puller (2007) finds that Californian electricity generators’ pricing is largely close to Cournot
behavior (so θ ≈ 1). Blonigan, Liebman and Wilson (2007) estimate that prices in the US steel industry
during the period 1980–2006 were almost always only slightly above marginal cost (so θ ' 0).
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Firm i’s equilibrium output, q∗i (t) satisfies the first order-condition, which equates firm
i’s marginal cost with the generalized marginal revenue function MRi(q) = P (Q)+θqiP
′(Q).
Formally, q∗i (t) obeys
P (Q∗(t)) + θq∗i (t)P
′∗(t)) = ci(t) +mq∗i (t). (12)
Re-arranging this equation gives us
ci(t) = P (Q
∗(t))
{
1− σi(t)
η(Q∗(t))
[θ + m¯(Q∗(t)]
}
(13)
where σi = qi/Q is firm i’s market share, η(Q) = |P (Q)/QP ′(Q)| is the industry price
elasticity of demand, and
m¯(Q) ≡ − m
P ′(Q)
(14)
is the ratio of the slope of marginal cost function to the slope of the demand function.12 It
follows from (13) that σi(t) ≥ σj(t) if and only if ci(t) ≤ cj(t), i.e., market shares at t vary
inversely with ci(t).
Assumptions on correlation between emissions and costs. In principle, zi(t) > 0
may vary across firms in any possible way, but for some of our results we shall assume that
emission intensities are non-negatively correlated with marginal costs. By this we mean that,
for all t ∈ [0, T ],
cov(c, z) ≡ 1
N
N∑
i=1
ci(t)zi(t)− 1
N2
N∑
i=1
ci(t)
N∑
i=1
zi(t) ≥ 0. (15)
We say that emissions intensities are co-monotonic with marginal costs if, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
zi(t) is weakly increasing with ci(t) and that it is uniform if zi(t) is equal for all firms. It
is not hard to check that co-monotonicity (and, as a special case, uniformity) is stronger
than—in fact, considerably stronger than—condition (15).
Using (13) it is straightforward to check that marginal costs and emissions intensities
are non-negatively correlated if and only if market shares and emissions intensities are non-
positively correlated. In other words, (15) is equivalent to
cov(σ, z) ≡ 1
N
N∑
i=1
σi(t)zi(t)− 1
N2
N∑
i=1
zi(t) ≤ 0, (16)
12 Note that any equilibrium with the same value of [θ + m¯(Q∗(t)] leads to the same equilibrium level of
output for firm i and hence also to the same market price (albeit not to the same level of profits).
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for all t ∈ [0, T ] (note that ∑Ni=1 σi(t) = 1).
It almost goes without saying that emissions intensities and marginal costs are not always
non-negatively correlated, but this condition is sufficiently weak to cover a broad range of
cases. By definition, a firm with the lower marginal cost is the one that uses fewer inputs
on average (with inputs weighted by their prices). It seems plausible that such a firm will
typically also use less of the inputs that cause emissions. Indeed, the general notion of
eco-efficiency holds that reducing waste also reduces costs (Alexander and Buchholz, 1978;
Porter and van der Linde, 1995), suggesting that costs and emissions are non-negatively
correlated.13
More recently, Bloom, Genakos, Martin and Sadun (2008) find strong empirical evidence
that more efficient manufacturing firms also tend to have lower energy and emissions inten-
sities. However, the condition is less likely to hold, for example, in an electricity market
where some firms operate coal-fired power plants (with low marginal costs, but high emis-
sions intensities), while, in addition, there are other firms that instead use cleaner, but also
more expensive inputs (such as gas). Nevertheless, the condition is very useful for deriving a
clean set of theoretical results, and the broad thrust of our conclusions—especially our main
results on partial PNA—remains valid with modest departures from this assumption (see
Section 5).
Assumption on demand curvature. We denote the elasticity of the slope of the inverse
demand function as
E(Q) ≡ −d logP
′(Q)
d logQ
.
We may also interpret E as an index of demand curvature. Clearly, E(Q) > 0 (E(Q) < 0) if
P ′′(Q) > 0 (P ′′(Q) < 0) and inverse demand is locally convex (concave) at Q. We maintain
throughout the paper the assumption that inverse demand is not too convex, in the sense
that
N + θ(1− E(Q)) + m¯(Q) > 0. (17)
13 See also Heal (2008) for several case studies, such as the internal emissions trading scheme set up by BP,
which reduced emissions and also cut costs; Dow Chemical and Du Pont provide similar evidence. King and
Lenox (2001), amongst others, find a positive correlation between environmental and financial performance.
Although there is considerable debate on the reasons for this relationship (Konar and Cohen, 2001), for our
purposes the nature and direction of causality between environmental and financial performance is irrelevant,
and it suffices that they are non-negatively correlated.
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This is a natural assumption to make because it is necessary and sufficient for industry
output to fall when emissions trading is introduced (see Proposition 4).14
In the case where firms are engaging in Cournot competition (θ = 1), a necessary and
sufficient condition for the best response curve of firm i to be downward-sloping at its equi-
librium output q∗i is that
1− σiE(Q∗) > 0 (18)
(see, for example, Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985) and Shapiro (1989)).15 If this
condition holds for each firm i, then the Cournot oligopoly is locally a game of strategic
substitutes. A sufficient condition for (18) is that E(Q∗) ≤ 1, which is equivalent to saying
that the demand function, i.e., the function P−1, is locally log-concave at P (Q∗). Indeed
this condition is necessary if (18) is to hold for any distribution of market shares.
We also know that if the demand function is globally log-concave, then the Cournot
game has a globally unique and stable equilibrium (Shapiro (1989)). For these reasons
and others, the log-concavity of the industry demand curve is a reasonable and commonly-
made assumption (see, for example, Farrell and Shapiro (1990) and Shapiro (1989)).16 This
assumption will also feature prominently in some of our main results.
For the rest of this section, we shall examine the impact of the ETS on output, price,
market shares, and emissions. Building on this, we examine the impact of the ETS on profits,
and thus PNA, in Section 4.
3.1. The impact of the ETS on output and price
The following proposition gives the impact of the ETS on firm- and industry-level output and
is crucial to understanding its impact on costs and firm profits. We have omitted arguments
14 See Bergstrom and Varian (1985) for another use of this condition (in the case where m¯ = 0), and Seade
(1980) for an early application that notes the importance of demand curvature.
15 Using equation (62) (with θ = 1), it is straightforward to show that the slope of i’s best response curve is
−[1−σiE(Q∗)]/[2−σiE(Q∗) + m¯]. The second-order condition at firm i’s profit-maximizing output requires
the denominator to be positive, so this expression is negative if and only if its numerator is positive, hence
condition (18).
16 For products that are consumed only as a single unit or none at all, market demand at price p is
proportional to F¯ (p) = 1−F (p), where F is the distribution of the reservation prices. A sufficient condition
for F¯ to be log-concave is for F to be generated by a log-concave density function. Many commonly used
density functions have this property, see Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005).
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to reduce clutter; note that P ′, E, and m¯ are evaluated at Q∗(t), while zi and σi are evaluated
at t.
Proposition 4. At any t ∈ [0, T ] output responses are given by
dQ∗
dt
=
∑N
i=1 zi
P ′ [N + θ(1− E) + m¯] < 0; (19)
dQ∗−i
dt
=
dQ∗
dt
{
[(θ + m¯) + (1− θσiE)]
(θ + m¯)
− [N + θ(1− E) + m¯]
(θ + m¯)
zi∑N
i=1 zi
}
(20)
dq∗i
dt
=
dQ∗
dt
{
−(1− θσiE)
(θ + m¯)
+
[N + θ(1− E) + m¯]
(θ + m¯)
zi∑N
i=1 zi
}
(21)
It is clear from (19) that the ETS reduces industry output if and only if the maintained
assumption (17) is satisfied. Consequently, the equilibrium price of output must increase
according to
dP ∗
dt
= P ′(Q∗)
dQ∗
dt
=
∑N
i=1 zi
[N + θ(1− E) + m¯] > 0. (22)
This formula is remarkably simple in that the price increase depends on only the unweighted
average of the emissions intensities and on no other feature of its distribution. So a change
in emissions intensities that leaves its unweighted average unchanged does not modify the
local price impact of the ETS.
Consider the hypothetical situation where zi = 1 for all i, so every firm experiences a
one-dollar increase in marginal cost (see (10)). Then
dP ∗
dt
=
N
[N + θ(1− E) + m¯] ≡ κ. (23)
The term κ is known as the rate of cost pass-through since it measures the change in the
equilibrium price following a common increase in the marginal cost of every firm in the
oligopoly. Loosely speaking, if marginal cost increases by a dollar at every firm, then the
equilibrium price rises by κ dollars. Note that the rate of cost pass-through κ ≤ 1 under
perfect competition (i.e., θ = 0 and m¯ > 0). When θ > 0, κ ≤ 1 for all m¯ ≥ 0 if and only if
E(Q∗) ≤ 1, i.e., demand is log-concave.
Using (10), we may also re-write (22) as
dP ∗
dt
= κ
1
N
[
N∑
i=1
∂Mi
∂t
(q∗i (t), t)
]
.
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This says that the output price increase following an increase in the emissions price is pro-
portional to the rise in the unweighted marginal cost, with the rate of cost pass-through κ
as the proportionality constant.
While overall industry output falls with the introduction of the ETS, there is hetero-
geneity across firms in their individual output responses. In particular, it is not hard to see
from Proposition 4 that, for certain parameter values, some firms can increase their output
with t. However, with uniform emissions intensities, there are two important cases where
this will not happen: [I] if competition is perfect (θ = 0), or if [II] demand is linear (E = 0),
for which (21) reduces to dq∗i /dt = (1/N)(dQ
∗/dt) < 0 (for all i).
3.2. The impact of the ETS on market shares
It is clear from Proposition 4 that the impact of the ETS does not fall equally across firms.
However, while the scheme affects relative output and hence market shares, its effect is not
indeterminate. We now show that under reasonable assumptions, the introduction of the
ETS (and, more generally, an increase in t) will raise market concentration. This effect on
market concentration may not be large (and will not be large if the ETS raises each firm’s
overall cost only modestly) but it is important that we establish the direction of the effect.
To see why the ETS favors large firms, use (19) and (21) to obtain
dσi
dt
=
1
Q∗
dQ∗
dt
{
−(1 + σi[θ(1− E) + m¯])
(θ + m¯)
+
[N + θ(1− E) + m¯]
(θ + m¯)
zi∑N
i=1 zi
}
. (24)
We wish to highlight two factors that have an important influence on the impact of the ETS
on market shares: the curvature of demand and the distribution of emissions intensities. We
consider each in turn.
First, assume that emissions intensities are uniform across firms, so that all firms ex-
perience the same increase in marginal cost. In this case, it is clear from (24) that dσi/dt
increases with σi (for all θ ≥ 0 and m¯ ≥ 0) if and only if E(Q∗) ≤ 1. Furthermore, it follows
from (24) that
sign
(
dσi
dt
)
= sign
{(
σi − 1
N
)
[θ(1− E) + m¯]
}
.
In other words, firms with larger (lower) than average market share will gain (lose) market
share. It is straightforward to check that this will raise market concentration as measured
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by the Herfindahl index H =
∑N
i=1 σ
2
i ; formally,
dH
dt
= 2
N∑
i=1
σi
dσi
dt
≥ 0. (25)
The other factor influencing the impact of the ETS on market shares is the distribution
of emissions intensities. Consider firms m and n with the same initial market share but
different emissions intensities, with zm < zn. Then (24) shows that dσm/dt > dσn/dt, so
firm n fares less well under the ETS (in terms of market share) because it experiences a
larger increase in marginal cost than firm m.
When E(Q∗) ≤ 1 and emissions intensities are co-monotonic with marginal costs (and
hence weakly decreasing with σi), both factors work in favor of larger firms. This is reflected
in (24) where it is clear that dσi/dt increases with σi (and since
∑N
i=1 dσi/dt = 0, the larger
firms will gain market share). When co-monotonicity is replaced with the weaker assumption
that emissions intensities and marginal costs are non-negatively correlated, it is no longer
true that dσi/dt increases with σi. However, one can still show (see Appendix A) that the
Herfindahl index increases with t.
Proposition 5. Suppose that emissions intensities are non-negatively correlated with marginal
cost and that either (a) the industry is perfectly competitive (θ = 0) or (b) the demand func-
tion is log-concave (E ≤ 1). Then
dH
dt
≥ 0.
3.3. The impact of the ETS on emissions
As the ETS lowers total industry output, total emissions will fall if the average emissions
intensity of firms falls. Letting z∗(t) denote average emissions intensity and noting that
z∗(t) =
∑N
i=1 σ(t)zi(t), we obtain
dz∗
dt
=
N∑
i=1
zi
dσi
dt
+
N∑
i=1
dzi
dt
σi. (26)
Standard production theory tells us that dzi/dt ≤ 0 (in other words, firms make abatement
decisions), so the second term on the right of this equation is always negative. If emissions
intensity is uniform across firms, the first term on the right equals zero since
∑N
i=1 dσi/dt = 0
and we conclude that average emissions intensity must fall.
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If emissions intensity is not uniform, the sign of the first term on the right of (26)—and
thus the sign of dz∗/dt—cannot be guaranteed without further assumptions. While the ETS
induces each individual firm to lower its emissions intensity, it is possible for this effect to
be negated in part or in whole by strategic effects. If the ETS causes firms with (initially)
low emissions intensities to gain market share, then it has a doubly beneficial effect. On the
other hand, if these firms lose market share, this diminishes the scheme’s ability to lower
emissions in this industry.17 To guarantee that the former holds, we once again rely on the
assumptions that demand is log-concave and that emissions intensities are non-negatively
correlated with marginal costs. We know from Proposition 5 that the ETS raises market
concentration under these conditions; loosely speaking, large firms gain market share at the
expense of small firms. Since large firms have lower cost and (by the correlation assumption
again) typically lower emissions, average emissions intensity will fall.
Proposition 6. Average emissions intensity z∗ and total emissions ζ∗ satisfy
dz∗
dt
≤ 0 and dζ
∗
dt
≤ 0
if any of the following conditions are satisfied: (a) emissions intensities are uniform; (b)
emissions intensities are non-negatively correlated with marginal cost and the industry is
perfectly competitive (θ = 0); or (c) emissions intensities are non-negatively correlated with
marginal cost and the demand function is log-concave (E ≤ 1).
4. Profit-neutral permit allocations
Having established the impact of the ETS on output, price, market shares, and emissions, we
now turn to examine its impact on profits. In particular, we develop formulae that determine
the level of free permit allocations required to ensure profit-neutrality at the level of the firm
and of the industry. We use these formulae to show that, under conditions that ought to be
satisfied in many situations, average PNA in the industry is not just partial, but low.
17 The possibility of such perverse effects has also been noted in Levin’s (1985) study of taxation in a
Cournot model.
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4.1. PNA for an individual firm
Suppose the introduction of the ETS leads to an emissions permit price of T > 0. By
definition, the proportion of free permit allocation, γi(T ), needed to preserve firm i’s profit
(at the level before the introduction of the ETS) satisfies
Π∗i (T ) + T γi(T )ζ
∗
i (0) = Π
∗
i (0). (27)
Defining
γ˜i(t) = − 1
ζ∗i (t)
dΠ∗i
dt
(28)
and re-arranging (27) we obtain
γi(T ) = − [Π
∗
i (T )− Π∗i (0)]
Tζ∗i (0)
=
1
Tζ∗i (0)
∫ T
0
γ˜i(t)ζ
∗
i (t) dt. (29)
It follows from (28) and (29) that
γ˜i(0) = − 1
ζ∗i (0)
lim
T→0
[Π∗i (T )− Π∗i (0)]
T
= lim
T→0
γi(T ). (30)
In other words, γ˜i(0) gives the approximate value of γi(T ) when T is small.
Suppose we know that ζ∗i (t) is decreasing in t; then max0≤t≤T γ˜i(t) is an upper bound of
γi(T ) since
γi(T ) ≤ 1
Tζ∗i (0)
max
0≤t≤T
γ˜i(t)
∫ T
0
ζ∗i (t) dt ≤ max
0≤t≤T
γ˜i(t) (31)
Therefore, to bound the value of γi(T ), it will be helpful to have a formula for γ˜i. To obtain
such a formula, write the equilibrium profit of firm i as
Π∗i (t) = q
∗
i (t)P (q
∗
i (t) +Q
∗
−i(t))− ci(t)q∗i (t)−
1
2
m [q∗i (t)]
2 . (32)
Differentiating this with respect to t, we obtain
dΠ∗i
dt
= −c′i(t)q∗i + [P (Q∗) + q∗i P ′∗(Q∗)− ci −mq∗i ]
dq∗i
dt
+ q∗i P
′(Q∗)
dQ∗−i
dt
= −ziq∗i + (1− θ)q∗i P ′(Q∗)
dq∗i
dt
+ q∗i P
′(Q∗)
dQ∗−i
dt
. (33)
where the second equation relies on c′i(t) = zi(t) (by Shephard’s Lemma (see (9)) and the
first-order condition (12). Inserting this expression for dΠ∗i /dt into (28) we obtain
γ˜i = 1− P
′(Q∗)
zi
[
(1− θ)dq
∗
i
dt
+
dQ∗−i
dt
]
. (34)
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So, with Cournot-Nash behavior (θ = 1), PNA is partial, γ˜i < 1, if and only if firm i’s faces
a more favorable residual demand curve following the introduction of the ETS, dQ∗−i/dt < 0.
Using the expressions for dq∗i /dt and dQ
∗
−i/dt from Proposition 4 (see (21) and (20)) in
(34) gives us the formula (35) for γ˜i and hence the following result.
Proposition 7. Suppose ζ∗i is decreasing in t. Then γi(T ) ≤ max0≤t≤T γ˜i(t), where
γ˜i(t) =
(2θ + m¯)
(θ + m¯)
− [(θ + m¯) + θ(1− θσiE)]
(θ + m¯) [N + θ(1− E) + m¯]
∑N
j=1 zj
zi
. (35)
Observe that γ˜(t) ≡ 1 for a monopolist (with N = 1 and θ = 1), so γ˜(0) = 1 and thus
γ(T ) is approximately equal to 100% for small T (as expected from Section 2.2).18
The situation becomes more complicated for an oligopoly. It is clear from the formula
(35) that γ˜i(0) (and hence γi(T ) for small values of T ) will typically not be the same across
firms. Almost inevitably, a “one-size-fits-all” allocation policy, in which every firm receives
the same proportion of freely allocated permits, will lead to overcompensation for some firms
and undercompensation for others. Indeed, even firms with identical emissions intensities
may have different values of γ˜i(0) if they have different market shares.
Of course, different emissions intensities will also lead to different PNA values. These
differences can be large; for example, if demand is linear (E = 0), firms have constant
marginal costs (m¯ = 0), and are playing a Cournot-Nash game (θ = 1), then
γ˜i(0) = 2
[
1− 1
(N + 1)
∑N
j=1 zj(0)
zi(0)
]
. (36)
Clearly, γ˜i(0) < 0 if zi(0)/(
∑N
j=1 zj(0)) is sufficiently close to zero, which means that γi(T ) <
0 for small T (by (30). In this case, the adverse cost impact of the ETS is so much greater
on firm i’s rivals that firm i’s strategic position improves to the extent that it makes a higher
profit after the introduction of the scheme. At the other extreme, if zi(0)/(
∑N
j=1 zj(0)) is
sufficiently close to 1 then γ˜i(0) > 1, so even an allocation of permits to cover all its emissions
at the pre-ETS level is not sufficient to bring the firm’s profit back to the pre-ETS level.
Apart from complete firm symmetry, there are two interesting cases when γ˜i(t) is the
same across firms: when emissions intensities are uniform and [I] the industry is perfectly
18 See point (2) in the discussion following Proposition 3. Note that that result is in fact more general
because, unlike in this section, it does not require that output be a single good.
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competitive (θ = 0) or [II] market demand is linear (E = 0). Furthermore, in both of these
cases, PNA has a uniformly low bound for plausible parameter values. Recall from our
discussion of Proposition 4 that, in both of these cases, output responses satisfy dq∗i /dt =
(1/N)(dQ∗/dt) < 0 (for all i), so that all firms reduce emissions, dζ∗i /dt < 0, and Proposition
7 is applicable.
[I] With perfect competition, the formula (35) gives γ˜i(t) = m¯(Q
∗(t))/(N + m¯(Q∗(t)))
for every firm i and all t ∈ [0, T ]. In particular, for any two firms i and j, γ˜i(0) = γ˜j(0) so
that (by (30)) PNA is approximately the same across firms for small T . By Proposition 7,
we obtain (even when T is not necessarily small)
γi(T ) ≤ mˆ
(N + mˆ)
for all i, (37)
where mˆ = supt∈[0,T ] m¯(Q
∗(t)). This bound is common to all firms and lower than 100%.
It will be small if the industry consists of many firms (large N) and if mˆ is not too big.
Recall that m¯(Q∗(t)) = m/P ′∗(t)), where m > 0 is the slope of the marginal cost function.
Under perfect competition, m is also the slope of the industry supply curve,19 so m¯ is the
ratio of the slopes of supply and demand curves. To have a sense of what this means for
PNA, suppose the supply curve is no more than twice as steep as the demand curve, so that
m¯ ≤ 2. In this case, γi(T ) ≤ 2/(N + 2) for all i; this implies that PNA will be very low
whenever the industry has anything more than a handful of firms.
[II] When demand is linear, E ≡ 0 and we have γ˜i(t) = (2θ + m¯)/(N + θ + m¯) for every
firm i and for all t ∈ [0, T ]. (Note that m¯ = m/P ′ is now independent of t since demand
is linear.) By (30), PNA is approximately the same across firms for small T , and will be
partial so long as θ < N (which is an extremely mild condition20). By Proposition 7, we
obtain (for not necessarily small T )
γi(T ) =
2θ + m¯
(N + θ + m¯)
for all i. (38)
Note that this bound is decreasing in θ, so firm-level PNA is lower in a more competitive
industry. For example, consider a Cournot oligopoly (θ = 1) with constant returns so scale
19 This is because each firm’s supply curve corresponds with its marginal cost curve.
20 This condition corresponds to the equilibrium price from a symmetric oligopoly being lower than the
monopoly price.
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(m¯ = 0). Then γi(T ) ≤ 2/(N + 1), which is less than 1/3 whenever N ≥ 5. If m¯ = 2, the
bound is γi(T ) ≤ 4/(N + 3), which is less than 1/3 whenever N ≥ 9.
Apart from cases [I] and [II], firm-level PNA need not be similar and uniformly low.
However, as we show in the next section, while there may be significant variation at the level
of the firm, average PNA (across the whole industry) is low under a broad set of conditions.
4.2. Average PNA for an industry
We now examine the level of PNA needed for profit-neutrality for an industry as a whole.
This number is more relevant than firm-specific PNA in terms of providing policy guidance
on how many permits to freely allocate to firms (and conversely how many to auction), since
firms are often included in an ETS on an industry-by-industry basis.
By definition, at the permit price T , the industry-level PNA γ(T ) satisfies Π∗(T ) +
T γ(T )ζ∗(0) = Π∗(0). By an argument analogous to used to derive (29), we obtain
γ(T ) =
1
Tζ∗(0)
∫ T
0
γ˜(t)ζ∗(t) dt, (39)
where
γ˜(t) = − 1
ζ∗(t)
dΠ∗
dt
(t) = − 1
ζ∗(t)
N∑
i=1
dΠ∗i
dt
(t). (40)
Note also that γ˜(0) = limT→0 γ(T ) so γ˜(0) gives the approximate value of γ(T ) when T is
small. If we know that ζ∗ is decreasing in T , then we have
γ(T ) ≤ 1
Tζ∗(0)
max
0≤t≤T
γ˜(t)
∫ T
0
ζ∗(t) dt ≤ max
0≤t≤T
γ˜(t) (41)
Note that dΠ∗i /dt = −z∗i q∗i γ˜i (see (28)), so we may re-write (5) as
γ˜(t) =
∑N
i=1 ziσiγ˜i∑N
i=1 ziσi
. (42)
Equations (42) and (35) yield a formula for γ˜ (43) and so we obtain the following result.
Proposition 8. Suppose ζ∗ is decreasing in t. Then γ(T ) ≤ max0≤t≤T γ˜(t), where
γ˜(t) =
2θ + m¯
θ + m¯
− [(θ + m¯) + θ(1− θHE)]
(θ + m¯) (N + θ(1− E) + m¯)
∑N
j=1 zj∑N
i=1 σizi
. (43)
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In principle, γ˜ can take on a wide range of values, both positive and negative. For exam-
ple, it is known (see, for example, Kimmel (1992)) that in a symmetric Cournot oligopoly
with constant marginal costs, a common increase in marginal cost raises total profit (in our
notation, Π∗(t) > Π∗(0) for small t > 0) if and only if E(Q∗(0)) > 2. We can recover this
result using (43); with θ = 1, m¯ = 0, H = 1/N , and zi = zj for any i and j, it is easy to
check that γ˜(0) < 0 if and only if E(Q∗(0)) > 2. Therefore, γ(T ) < 0 for small T values,
which means that industry profits increase with the introduction of the ETS, so the industry
is (at least weakly) better off even if it has to buy all the permits it needs at the market
price. This observation is an extreme manifestation of the general rule that in a symmetric
Cournot equilibrium (θ = 1 and H = 1/N), PNA is partial for small T since
γ˜ =
2− E + m¯
(N + 1− E + m¯) < 1.
On the other hand, it is also possible for γ˜ to exceed 100%. For example, consider a
Cournot duopoly with constant marginal costs and uniform emissions intensity that faces a
unit-elastic demand curve P (Q) = K/Q (so industry revenue is constant at K and E = 2).
It is easily checked that γ˜1 = 2(σ1 − σ2) and hence that γ˜1 = −γ˜2. With symmetric firms,
therefore, PNA is zero for both firms (and for the industry as well), but if σ1 >
3
4
, then γ˜1 > 1
and γ˜2 < −1. The average PNA γ˜ = 2(σ1−σ2)2 exceeds unity if σ1 > (
√
2 + 1)/2
√
2 ≈ 85%.
Such examples notwithstanding, industry PNA is partial—and indeed low—under a broad
set of conditions. We assume that emissions intensities and costs are non-negatively corre-
lated and in all the cases [1] to [5] listed below, either θ = 0 or E ≤ 1. Therefore, Proposition
6 guarantees that industry emissions is decreasing in t. This in turn means that Proposition
8 is applicable and γ(T ) ≤ max0≤t≤T γ˜(t). Furthermore, in all these cases, it is trivial to
check that (θ + m¯) + θ(1− θHE) ≥ 0. Therefore,
γ˜ ≤ β˜ ≡ 2θ + m¯
θ + m¯
− N [θ + m¯+ θ(1− θHE)]
(θ + m¯) (N + θ(1− E) + m¯) . (44)
It follows that
γ(T ) ≤ max
0≤t≤T
β˜(t) ; (45)
this bound has the important advantage of being independent of firms’ emissions intensities,
and leads to the following results.21
21The proof of all five cases below can be found in Appendix A.
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Case [1] In a perfectly competitive industry,
γ(T ) ≤ mˆ
(N + mˆ)
(46)
where mˆ = supt∈[0,T ] m¯(Q
∗(t)).
Case [2] If the industry demand curve is linear,
γ(T ) ≤ 2θ + m¯
(N + θ + m¯)
. (47)
Note that the bounds obtained for cases [1] and [2] correspond exactly to the firm-level
bounds obtained for cases [I] and [II] in the previous subsection (see (37) and (38)).22 As we
have already argued, these bounds are low for plausible values of N , m¯ and θ.
For a perfectly competitive industry, the profit impact of the ETS has an instructive
graphical depiction.23 In Figure 1, the market supply curve has slope S ′ = m/N since it is
the (‘horizontal’) sum of each firm’s marginal cost function. The pre-ETS output is Q∗(0)
and the industry’s aggregate profit is given by the area of the triangle abc. The ETS raises
marginal cost and leads to a parallel upward shift of the supply curve. The new equilibrium
output is Q∗(T ) with price P ∗(T ); aggregate industry profit falls by the area abde. Note that
the area abde must shrink as the supply curve becomes flatter or the demand curve becomes
steeper.24 In other words, PNA is low when the supply curve is flat or the demand curve is
steep, as is consistent with the bound on γ(T ) in (46). Assuming that demand is linear, and
defining η ≡ S ′/(−P ′), we have
γ(T ) ≤ m¯
(N + m¯)
=
m
N(−P ′) +m =
S ′
(−P ′) + S ′ =
η
(1 + η)
. (48)
With linear demand and perfect competition, cost pass-through κ = 1/(1+η) is independent
of t (using (23)), so (48) has the intuitive form γ(T ) ≤ 1− κ.
Case [3] If θ ≤ 1 and E ≤ 1, then γ(T ) ≤ 1.
This result says that PNA is partial whenever demand is log-concave and competitive be-
havior as measured by the conduct parameter is (weakly) more competitive than Cournot.
22 But there is a significant difference in the assumptions. The industry-level bounds were obtained
under the assumption that emissions intensities and marginal costs are non-negatively correlated, while the
firm-level results rely on the stronger assumption that emissions are uniform across firms.
23 Bovenberg and Goulder (2001) and Bovenberg et al. (2005) provide a similar graphical analysis. In
their context, the supply curve is upward sloping because capital has limited ability to move out of an
ETS-affected sector in the short term.
24 To see that the loss in profit decreases as the supply curve becomes flatter, pivot the supply curves
clockwise at the points b and f . Pivoting the demand curve clockwise at b also shrinks abde.
24
a b
c
de
)(* TQ )0(*Q
)(* TP S
S
f
D
Figure 1: ETS under perfect competition
Case [4] If θ ≤ 1, E ≤ 1, and H(Q∗(0)) ≥ (2θ + m¯(Q∗(0)))/ (θ(θ +N + m¯(Q∗(0)))),
then
γ(T ) ≤ θH(T ). (49)
Substituting θ = 1 and m¯(Q∗(0)) = 0 into this result shows that in a Cournot oligopoly with
H(0) ≥ 2/(N + 1) and constant marginal costs, industry-level PNA is bounded above by the
Herfindahl index, γ(T ) ≤ H(T ). The restriction H(0) ≥ 2/(N + 1) is permissive and likely
to be satisfied in many industries (including, for example, in our application to the cement
industry in Section 5). If it is, we obtain a tight upper bound on PNA since the Herfindahl
index is usually below 50%—and often considerably below this level. Although we know
from Proposition 5 that H(T ) will be higher than H(0), in most likely scenarios the cost of
emissions will be a small part of a firm’s total marginal costs, so that the ETS will not have
a big impact on the Herfindahl index.25
Case [5] If θ ≤ 1 and E ∈ [0, 1], then
γ(T ) ≤ max
{
2θ + m¯(Q∗(0))
(θ +N + m¯(Q∗(0)))
, θH(T )
}
. (50)
Unlike case [4], this result does not rely on a lower bound on H(0), but it does require that
the demand function to be convex (in addition to log-concavity). This assumption is not
25 Recent studies of the cost impact of CO2 pricing typically conclude that the likely cost impact is small
in most industries; see, e.g., Ho, Morgenstern and Shih (2008) on U.S. cap-and-trade proposals and de Bruyn
et al. (2008) on the EU ETS. Earlier studies also found that the cost of environmental regulations is typically
small (see, for example, Jaffe et al. (1995)).
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particularly restrictive, at least in the sense that most commonly used demand functions are
convex functions.26 The upper bound formula on γ(T ) is increasing in θ (so PNA is lower
for more competitive markets), and is a piecewise linear function of H, with a kink at
H∗ =
2θ + m¯(Q∗(0))
θ(θ +N + m¯(Q∗(0)))
. (51)
For H ≤ H∗, the bound is constant and equal to (2θ + m¯(Q∗(0)))/(θ +N + m¯(Q∗(0))) < 1;
for H > H∗, it is equal to θH. To have a sense of what it means for PNA, suppose we have
Cournot competition (θ = 1) with moderately increasing marginal cost m¯(Q∗(0)) ≤ 2 and a
Herfindahl index H(T ) < 1/2. Then γ(T ) ≤ max{4/(N + 3), H(T )}, so PNA will be lower
than 50% if N ≥ 5. If instead industry conduct is more competitive with θ = 1/2, then
γ(T ) ≤ max{6/(5 + 2N), H(T )/2} which is less than 40% if N ≥ 5.
These results show that PNA— and thus the profit impact of an ETS—will vary according
to industry characteristics. Whether, as a matter of public policy, there should be such
allocations and whether they ought (in some normative sense) to vary across industries is
a larger issue where other considerations may enter. Our results do suggest, however, that
PNA is modest in many scenarios so that even if permits are allocated based on the higher
end of those estimates, there will still be substantial auctioning.
Besides providing some guidance on permit allocations, our analysis could also be useful
in developing a positive theory of environmental regulation. We have shown which industry
characteristics are relevant in determining the profit impact of an ETS, and in what way.
This could help explain differences in the level of political resistance to emissions trading
and taxes in different industries and the types of settlement they reach with government.
4.3. Other issues in PNA calculations
Incorporating the overall emissions cap We have defined γ as the level of emissions
permits needed for profit-neutrality as a fraction of the industry’s initial (pre-ETS) demand
for permits. The same number of permits would obviously be a larger fraction of the actual
26 For example, Genesove and Mullin’s (1998) influential study of the U.S. sugar industry employs four
demand specifications. Three of these specifications, linear (E = 0), quadratic (E = 12 ), and exponential
(E = 1) demand, satisfy the condition E ∈ [0, 1]. Their fourth specification, constant-elasticity demand, has
E > 1; we discuss the robustness of our results to log-convex demand in Section 5.
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number of permits issued with the introduction of the ETS. In principle it is even possible
that profit-neutrality will require that an industry receives more permits than it needs to
cover its emissions. This is precisely the case for any industry run by a monopoly, where
profit-neutrality requires that it be a net supplier of permits to other firms in the scheme
(see Proposition 1).
However, for most plausible oligopoly situations, this will not arise. For example, suppose
an ETS is introduced across a number of industries, targeting an aggregate 20% fall in
emissions, from L to 0.8L. The market price of permits would adjust so that the aggregate
demand for permits equals the supply of 0.8L; let the clearing price of permits be T . Assume
that the industries covered by the ETS are Cournot oligopolies (θ = 1), with firms having
constant returns to scale. Assume also that each industry k’s Herfindahl index satisfies
2/
(
Nk + 1
) ≤ Hk < 0.4, where Nk is the number of firms in industry k. Using case [4]
(Section 4.2), we then know that γk(T ) ≤ Hk(T ) < 0.4. Therefore, the profit-neutral permit
allocation, as a fraction of the target level of emissions, for the ETS as a whole will not
exceed 0.4/0.8 or 50%.27 In other words, the total demand for permits will be twice as great
as the allocation of free permits.
Now suppose instead that the targeted emissions reduction is larger, say 40%. The
clearing price for emissions permits will be different, say T ′ > T (because total emissions is
a decreasing function of emissions price by Proposition 6). Industry k’s PNA will now be
bounded above by Hk(T ′). This is higher than Hk(T ) by Proposition 5, but let us assume
that Hk(T ′) is still lower than 0.4. The profit-neutral allocation, as a fraction of this (more
stringent) target level of emissions is then 0.4/0.6, or about 67%.
Finally, note that 0.4 is an extraordinarily high cap to impose on the Herfindahl index
and has the obvious effect of inflating our PNA estimates. All the upper bounds on PNA
will be halved if we use a (still concentrated) Herfindahl index of 0.2: with a 20% reduction
in emissions, PNA is 25% of the target level of emissions; with a 40% reduction in emissions,
it is 34% of the target level of emissions.28
27 If each industry is freely allocated 40% of its initial emissions, the total free allocation is 40% of the
aggregate initial emissions across all industries or 50% of post-ETS aggregate emissions.
28 The Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice considers Herfindahl indices between 0.10 and
0.18 to be moderately concentrated and indices above 0.18 to be concentrated. Ali et al. (2009) report an
average Herfindahl index of 0.064 for four-digit SIC industries using the U.S. Census of Manufactures over
the period 1982 to 2002.
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Tightening the bounds on PNA It is possible under some plausible assumptions to
tighten the upper bounds on PNA significantly. In particular, our estimate of γ(T ) in
equation (41) is permissive, and particularly permissive when the emissions reduction target
is large. This is because it uses only the fact that ζ∗ is decreasing to bound
∫ T
0
ζ∗(t) dt by
ζ∗(0)T . Suppose we know that ζ∗ is a decreasing and convex function of t, and assume that
the ETS targets a reduction in emissions from ζ∗(0) to αζ∗(0) for some α < 1. In that case,
we have
∫ T
0
ζ∗(t) dt ≤ ζ∗(0)[1 + α]T/2 and we may modify (41) in the following way:
γ(T ) ≤ 1
Tζ∗(0)
max
0≤t≤T
γ˜(t)
∫ T
0
ζ∗(t) dt ≤ (1 + α)
2
max
0≤t≤T
γ˜(t) (52)
Consider, once again, the 40% emissions reduction target discussed in the previous para-
graph. Then α = 0.6 and the profit-neutral allocation of permits is less than (0.4)(0.8)ζ∗(0)
(using (52) and assuming that the Herfindahl index is bounded by 0.4). As a fraction of the
target emissions level, the profit-neutral allocation of permits is bounded by (0.4)(0.8)/(0.6),
or about 53%. This is significantly below the 67% we calculated above without convexity.
To have a sense of when ζ∗ is a convex function of t suppose that emissions are uniform
across firms, so that ζ∗(t) = Q∗(t)z(t).29 Then
dζ∗
dt
= Q∗(t)
dz
dt
+ z
dQ∗
dt
. (53)
Since Q∗ and z are both decreasing in t, and dz/dt and dQ∗/dt are both non-positive, ζ∗
is a convex function of t if z∗ and Q∗ are convex functions of t; in other words, if dz/dt
and dQ∗/dt are both increasing in t. Whether or not z∗ is convex in t simply depends on
the emissions technology available; convexity is not, prima facie, an implausible assumption.
Re-writing (19) slightly, we have
dQ∗
dt
=
Nz(t)
P ′(Q∗(t)) [N + θ(1− E(Q∗(t))] +m < 0. (54)
With Q∗ and z are both decreasing in t, dQ∗/dt is increasing in t if E is positive and
non-decreasing in Q (the former to ensure that P ′(Q) is increasing with Q). Again, this
assumption is satisfied for various familiar demand specifications, including linear (E = 0),
quadratic (E = 1
2
), and exponential (E = 1) demand. We summarize our observations
formally as follows.
29 Unfortunately, we do not have an elegant formulation of when ζ∗(t) is convex in t when emissions
intensities are not uniform.
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Proposition 9. Suppose that E(Q) ∈ [0, 1] and non-decreasing in Q and the emissions
intensity z(t) is uniform across firms and convex in t. Then total equilibrium emissions,
ζ∗(t), is a decreasing and convex function of t, and (52) holds for αζ∗(0) = ζ∗(T ) < ζ∗(0).
For example, with linear demand (E = 0), γ˜(t) ≡ (2θ+ m¯)/(N + θ+ m¯) for all t ∈ [0, T ]
if emissions intensity is uniform across firms (use (43)). By (39),
γ(T ) =
γ˜
T ζ∗(0)
∫ T
0
ζ∗(t)dt.
Since z(t) and Q∗(t) are both decreasing in t, so is ζ∗(t) = z(t)Q∗(t). Therefore,
∫ T
0
ζ∗(t)dt ∈
[Tζ∗(T ), T ζ∗(0)] and we obtain
α
2θ + m¯
(N + θ + m¯)
≤ γ(T ) ≤ 2θ + m¯
(N + θ + m¯)
where, by definition, α = ζ∗(T )/ζ∗(0). Depending on the slope of demand and the shape of
z(t), γ(T ) could be anywhere between these two limits. By Proposition 9, however, if z(t)
is convex in t, then
γ(T ) ≤ (1 + α)
2
2θ + m¯
(N + θ + m¯)
.
Estimating PNA for an existing ETS So far we have considered the scenario where
an ETS is introduced and free permit allocations are used to compensate firms for profit
reductions. However, our analysis can be easily modified to determine the permit alloca-
tion needed to compensate firms for the reduction in profit arising from a tightening of an
(existing) emissions trading scheme. In formal terms, the initial emissions price is T > 0
and a tightening of the ETS leads to a higher price of T ′, which in turn causes a change in
average industry profit, from Π(T ) to Π(T ′). Let γ(T, T ′) be the profit-neutral allocation,
as a fraction of the industry’s initial demand for permits ζ∗(T ) as defined by the equation
Π(T ′) + γ(T, T ′)ζ∗(T ) = Π(T ). This may be rewritten as
γ(T, T ′) = − [Π(T
′)− Π(T )]
ζ∗(T )T ′
.
Since Π(T ′)− Π(T ) = − ∫ T ′
T
γ˜(t)ζ∗(t) dt (see (40)),
γ(T, T ′) =
(T ′ − T )
T ′
∫ T ′
T
γ˜(t)ζ∗(t) dt
(T ′ − T )ζ∗(T )
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Assuming that ζ∗ is decreasing in t, we have
∫ T ′
T
ζ∗(t) dt ≤ ζ∗(T )(T ′ − T ), so
γ(T, T ′) ≤ (T
′ − T )
T ′
max
T≤t≤T ′
γ˜(t) ≤ max
T≤t≤T ′
γ˜(t).
This result is clearly analogous to Proposition 8. Just as we used the formula for γ˜ to bound
γ(T ) in Section 4.2, we could now use it to bound γ(T, T ′).
5. Calculating PNA: an example
In our discussion of PNA so far, we have focussed on the case where demand is log-concave (so
E ≤ 1) and emissions and marginal costs are non-negatively correlated. It is useful to have
some appreciation of how sensitive PNA estimates are to departures from these assumptions.
To do this, we apply our formulae to make indicative calculations of PNA for the UK cement
industry, which is covered by the EU ETS, using different estimates of demand curvature
and of the correlation between emissions and marginal costs. The empirical approach we
adopt here could potentially be applied to other industries (to be) covered by an ETS.
For the UK cement industry, it is reasonable to set the number of firms at N = 8 with
a Herfindahl index H = 0.28.30 We assume that the firms are in a Cournot oligopoly (so
θ = 1) and firms have constant returns to scale (so m¯ = 0). Note that the concentration
condition H ≥ 2/(N +1) is satisfied and case [4] in Section 4.2 tells us that PNA is less than
H = 0.28 so long as demand is log-concave (E ≤ 1) and there is non-negative correlation
between emissions and marginal costs.
We now consider relaxing the assumption that demand is log-concave while retaining the
correlation assumption. Assuming that industry emissions is decreasing in t, we know from
(45) that γ(T ) is bounded above by
β˜ ≡ 2−N (2−HE)
(N + 1− E) . (55)
A less stringent way of bounding demand curvature E(Q∗) derives from what we call the
elasticity approach. Observe that we can write
E(Q∗) =
[
1 +
1
η(Q)
+
d log η(Q)
d logQ
]
Q=Q∗
, (56)
30 Appendix B contains a justification of these values and all other data used in this example.
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where η(Q) is the industry price elasticity of demand. With the commonly-made and rea-
sonable assumption that demand elasticity is non-decreasing in price (so ∂η(Q)/∂Q ≤ 0),
we thus obtain an upper bound on demand curvature E(Q∗) ≤ 1 + 1/η(Q∗) ≡ E¯, where
E¯ > 1. If demand has constant elasticity E(Q∗) = E¯, but otherwise E¯ may be a significant
overestimate of the true demand curvature. Calculating E¯ is usually straightforward, as
it is relatively easy to find estimates of price elasticity η(Q∗) for many emissions-intensive
industries from previous empirical work. For the UK cement industry, our ‘best guess’ is
η = 0.8 but we also use a low estimate of 0.5 and a high estimate of 2.0 to check robustness.
Since β˜ is increasing in E (see (55)),
β˜ ≤ β¯ ≡ 2−N
(
2−HE¯)(
N + 1− E¯) . (57)
Table 1 displays values for the upper bound E¯ on demand curvature, as well as of the upper
bound β¯ on PNA for our range of elasticity estimates. Notice that PNA (as bounded above
by β¯) is always below 50% for N = 8. We also repeat these calculations for a larger number
of firms in the industry (to account for any potential ambiguity over any very small firms not
captured in our industry data—since β¯ also increases with N). The upper-bound estimates
of PNA remain well below 100% for these cases, even in the limiting case as we let N →∞
and so β¯ → E¯H.
Table 1: Upper bounds on PNA in terms of price elasticity (η)
Price elasticity (η) E¯ β¯ (N = 8) β¯ (N = 10) β¯ (N = 12) E¯H
0.5 (low estimate) 3.00 0.45 0.55 0.61 0.84
0.8 (best guess) 2.25 0.38 0.43 0.47 0.63
2.0 (high estimate) 1.50 0.31 0.34 0.35 0.42
Now consider what happens if we relax the assumption that emissions intensities and
marginal costs are non-negatively correlated. In the formula for γ˜ in Proposition 8 (see 5),
the emissions-intensity component can be re-written as∑N
i=1 zi∑N
i=1 ziσi
=
Nz¯
z¯ +Ncov(σ, z)
(58)
where z¯ =
∑N
i=1 zi/N denotes the average emissions intensity across firms. By definition, the
correlation coefficient ρ (of z and σ) is the ratio of cov(σ, z) and the product of the standard
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deviations of z and σ. We write the standard deviation of z as z¯υ, so υ ≥ 0 is the coefficient
of variation of emissions intensities. It is not hard to check that the standard deviation of σ
can be written (
√
HN − 1)/N . In this way, we obtain
cov(σ, z) = ρ (z¯υ)
√
HN − 1
N
.
Thus we may re-write the formula for γ˜ (in equation (43), substituting θ = 1 and m¯ = 0) as
γ˜ = 2− [2−HE(Q
∗)]
[N + 1− E(Q∗)]
N(
1 + ρυ
√
HN − 1) (59)
By Proposition 8, PNA is bounded by γ˜, provided emissions are decreasing in t.
The formula (59) allows us to consider departures from the correlation condition ρ ≤ 0
that we have maintained up to this point. While detailed information on emissions intensities
across firms may not be available, the average emissions intensity across firms z¯ may be
known and also that emissions intensities are highly unlikely to lie outside a certain range,
say [z¯(1− s), z¯(1 + s)]. This information puts an upper bound on the coefficient of variation
υ ≤ s, which in turn implies an upper bound on γ˜ in (59). For the UK cement industry, the
information available suggests s ≤ 0.15 as an upper bound on the coefficient of variation.
Table 2 displays estimates of this upper bound on PNA for a range of (maximal) coefficients
of variation υ ≤ 0.15, as well as for the entire range of possible correlation coefficients
ρ ∈ [−1, 1]. We assume that demand is log-linear E(Q∗) = 1; the PNA estimates would be
lower for any strictly log-concave demand curve.
Note first that γ˜ ≤ H = 0.28 (as it should be) whenever the correlation coefficient is
negative, and that PNA itself turns negative for very low correlations. Also as expected, the
upper bound of the Herfindahl index is tight whenever the coefficient of variation is zero or
if the correlation coefficient is zero, as either of these imply that emissions intensities are
uniform across firms. Most significantly, these upper bounds on PNA remain low even if the
correlation is strongly positive. This exercise confirms something that is fairly clear from
(59): even with positive correlation (i.e., ρ > 0), PNA is low if either there is relatively little
variation in emissions intensities (low υ) or if firms’ market shares are sufficiently close to
symmetric (so H is close to 1/N).31
31 We also examined the “worst case” scenario for PNA in which the parameter values are all chosen to go
as far as possible in the “wrong” direction. In particular, let E = 3 for a constant-elasticity demand curve
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Table 2: Upper bounds on PNA in terms of correlation (ρ) and variation (υ) of
emissions intensities
Correlation ρ
Variation υ –1.0 –0.5 0 0.5 1.0
0.00 (uniform intensities) 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28
0.05 0.18 0.23 0.28 0.33 0.37
0.10 0.06 0.18 0.28 0.37 0.45
0.15 (maximal variation) –0.06 0.12 0.28 0.41 0.53
For the UK cement industry, a balanced view of this suite of estimates suggests that
PNA (as a fraction of initial emissions levels) is likely to be no greater than 25–45%. These
robustness checks give us confidence that our claim that PNA is typically partial and low
extends significantly beyond the benchmark assumptions that demand is log-concave and
there is non-negative correlation between emissions intensities and marginal costs.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we examined the impact of an emissions trading scheme on output, price,
emissions, market shares, and profits in a canonical theoretical framework. It was shown
that an ETS leads to more cost-efficient firms gaining market share and a reduction in
aggregate industry emissions under the following assumptions: (a) firms’ marginal costs
are non-negatively correlated with their emissions intensities and (b) the industry faces a
log-concave demand function. We also developed simple formulae to calculate firm- and
industry-level PNA. These formulae indicate that the profit impact of the ETS will differ
from one industry to another, depending on market structure, competitive conduct, firms’
emissions intensities, and demand conditions. However, PNA is low for a large set of plausible
parameter values. In particular, in a Cournot model with constant marginal costs, PNA
(measured as a fraction of pre-ETS emissions level) is lower than the Herfindahl index. In
this case, a profit-neutral ETS will typically involve the free allocation of less than 50% of
with the low elasticity estimate η = 0.5, and also let ρ = 1 and υ = 0.15, so both the correlation coefficient
and the coefficient of variation lead to as high a value of PNA as possible. Even in this very extreme case,
we find that γ˜ ≈ 0.67, so PNA remains clearly partial and low. Indeed, it is still lower than the proportion
of freely allocated permits in both phases I and II of the EU ETS.
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the permit allowances issued, and thus raise a significant amount of government revenue.
This analysis may help to inform public discussion of cap-and-trade schemes as they are
implemented in different parts of the world. Our results could also serve as a natural starting
point for further theoretical and empirical studies into ETS design.
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4: Let qˆi(Q−i, t) be the output of firm i at which it will have no
incentive to deviate, given total output of Q−i + qˆi(Q−i, t) and given its perception of how
total output will vary with its deviation. The function qˆi is defined implicitly through the
first-order condition
P (qˆi(Q−i, t) +Q−i) + θqˆi(Q−i, t)P ′(qˆi(Q−i, t) +Q−i) = ci(t) +mqˆi(Q−i, t). (60)
Differentiating (60) with respect to t, we obtain
∂qˆi
∂t
=
zi
(1 + θ)P ′ + θqˆiP ′′ −m (61)
Differentiating (60) by Q−i we obtain
∂qˆi
∂Q−i
= − (P
′ + θqˆiP ′′)
(1 + θ)P ′ + θqˆiP ′′ −m, (62)
from which we obtain
∂qˆi
∂Q−i
+ 1 =
θP ′ −m
(1 + θ)P ′ + θqˆiP ′′ −m. (63)
At the equilibrium q∗(t), we have qˆi(Q∗−i(t), t) + Q
∗
−i(t) ≡ Q∗(t). Differentiating this with
respect to t we obtain
dQ∗−i
dt
(
∂qˆi
∂Q−i
+ 1
)
=
dQ∗
dt
− ∂qˆi
∂t
. (64)
Using (61) and (63), we obtain
dQ∗−i
dt
=
dQ∗
dt
[(1 + θ)P ′ + θq∗i P
′′ −m]
(θP ′ −m) −
zi
(θP ′ −m) (65)
Summing this equation across all firms gives us
(N − 1)dQ
∗
dt
=
dQ∗
dt
[(1 + θ)NP ′ + θQP ′′ −Nm]
(θP ′ −m) −
∑N
i=1 zi
(θP ′ −m) (66)
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and hence
dQ∗
dt
=
∑N
i=1 zi
[(θ +N)P ′ + θQP ′′ −m] . (67)
Using the definitions E(Q∗) = −Q∗P ′′(Q∗)/P ′(Q∗) and m¯ = m/(−P ′∗)) gives us (19). It
follows from (65) and (67) that
dQ∗−i
dt
=
dQ∗
dt
{
[(1 + θ)P ′ + θq∗i P
′′ −m]
(θP ′ −m) −
[(θ +N)P ′ + θQP ′′ −m]zi
(
∑N
i=1 zi)(θP
′ −m)
}
This gives us (20). Since dq∗i /dt = dQ
∗/dt − dQ∗−i/dt, we may derive (21) from (19) and
(20). QED
Proof of Proposition 5: Using (24) and (25), we obtain
dH
dt
=
2
NQ∗
dQ∗
dt
{
− N
(θ + m¯)
+
NH[θ(E − 1)− m¯]
(θ + m¯)
+
[N + θ(1− E) + m¯]
(θ + m¯)
∑N
i=1 ziσi∑N
i=1 zi/N
}
.
(68)
Since dQ∗/dt < 0, dH/dt ≥ 0 if the term in curly brackets is non-positive. Since market
shares and emissions intensities are negatively correlated (16), the term in curly brackets is
bounded above by
(NH − 1)([θ(E − 1)− m¯]
θ + m¯
, (69)
which is non-positive since E ≤ 1 and H ≥ 1/N . QED
Proof of Proposition 6: Since dQ∗/dt < 0 (see (19)), dζ∗/dt ≤ 0 if dz∗/dt ≤ 0. For case
(a), we have already established that dz∗/dt ≤ 0 in the main part of the paper. For case
(b), it suffices to show that
∑N
i=1 zi (dσi/dt) ≤ 0. By (24), we have that
N∑
i=1
zi
dσi
dt
=
1
NQ∗
dQ∗
dt

−N(
∑N
i=1 zi)
(θ + m¯)
+
N [θ(E − 1)− m¯](∑Ni=1 σizi)
(θ + m¯)
+
[N + θ(1− E) + m¯]
(θ + m¯)
∑N
i=1 z
2
i∑N
i=1 zi/N
 . (70)
We require the term in the curly brackets to be non-negative. Using the fact that
∑N
i=1 z
2
i ≥
(
∑N
i=1 zi)
2/N , the term in the curly brackets is bounded below by
[θ(1− E) + m¯]
[∑N
i=1 zi −N
∑N
i=1 σizi
]
(θ + m¯)
, (71)
which is non-negative since both terms in the numerator are non-negative (by (16)). QED
Proof of cases [1] to [5], Section 4.2: For cases [1] and [2], the bounds are obtained by
substituting θ = 0 and E = 0 into (44) respectively.
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To prove the other cases, we rewrite β˜ as
β˜ = 1 +
θ(1−HN)
(θ + m¯)
− Nθ(θ +N + m¯) [(2θ + m¯)/ (θ(θ +N + m¯))−H]
(θ + m¯)(N + θ(1− E) + m¯) (72)
For H > (2θ + m¯)/ (θ(θ +N + m¯)), β˜ is an increasing function of E, so we may replace E
with 1 to obtain (from (44))
γ˜ ≤ β˜ ≤ 2θ + m¯
(θ + m¯)
− N [θ + m¯+ θ(1− θH)]
(θ + m¯) (N + m¯)
. (73)
Since(θ + m¯) + θ(1− θH) ≥ 0, the upper bound for γ˜ in (73) is an increasing function of N .
Letting N →∞, we obtain
β˜ ≤ θ
2H
(θ + m¯)
≤ θH. (74)
Since H is increasing in t by Proposition 5, θH(t) ≤ θH(T ), completing the proof of case
[4].
Suppose H = (2θ + m¯)/ (θ(θ +N + m¯)), then β˜ = (2θ + m¯)/(θ + N + m¯), which is less
than 1 so long as θ < N . Suppose H ≤ (2θ+ m¯)/ (θ(θ +N + m¯)), then the last term on the
right of (72) is positive, so that
β˜ ≤ 1 + θ(1−HN)
θ + m¯
(75)
This bound cannot be improved on since the last term on the right of (72) goes to zero as
E → −∞. The right hand side of (75) is a decreasing function of H and is greatest when
H = 1/N , where it equals 1. Therefore, we know that so long as θ < N , β˜ ≤ 1 for H
between 1/N and (2θ + m¯)/ (θ(θ +N + m¯)).
Therefore, we have shown that for all values of H (whether smaller or greater than
(2θ + m¯)/ [θ(θ +N + m¯)]), β˜ ≤ 1. This completes the proof of case [3].
Finally, to prove case (5), note that when H ≤ (2θ + m¯)/ (θ(θ +N + m¯)), β˜ is an
decreasing function of E (see (72)). Therefore, we may bound it above by setting E = 0.
This gives the value (2θ + m¯(Q∗(t)))(θ +N + m¯(Q∗(t))). We conclude that
β˜(t) ≤ max
{
2θ + m¯(Q∗(t))
(θ +N + m¯(Q∗(t)))
, θH(t)
}
. (76)
Since Q is decreasing in t and P is convex, −P ′ is increasing in t, so m¯ is decreasing in t.
Therefore, m¯(Q∗(0)) ≥ m¯(Q∗(t)) for all t ∈ [0, T ]. On the other hand, H(T ) ≥ H(t) for all
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t ∈ [0, T ]. Therefore, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
β˜(t) ≤ max
{
2θ + m¯(Q∗(0))
(θ +N + m¯(Q∗(0)))
, θH(T )
}
. (77)
This completes our proof of case [5]. QED
Appendix B: The UK cement industry
There are five certified types of cement: Portland cement, Portland blast furnace cement,
sulphate-resisting cement, masonry cement, and Portland pulverized fuel ash cement—which
are considered in aggregate in Section 5 because they are manufactured with a very similar
process (Environment Agency, 2005). The UK cement market is dominated by the four
members of the British Cement Association: Lafarge Cement UK (previously Blue Circle),
Castle Cement (owned by Heidelberg Cement), Cemex (previously Rugby Cement) and
Buxton Lime Industries. These four firms collectively produce around 90% of the cement
sold in the UK, with approximate market shares of 40%, 25%, 20% and 5% (Environment
Agency, 2005). Imports from four other firms (all manufacturing within the EU and subject
to the EU ETS) supply the remainder. This gives a Herfindahl index of around H = 0.28
with a number of firms N = 8.
Estimates of the price elasticity of demand for cement in the UK do not seem to be
readily available. Jans and Rosenbaum (1997) find an average elasticity of demand of 0.80
for cement industry in the U.S. More recently, Ryan (2005) finds an elasticity of 2.95 from
US market-level data on prices and quantities. While noting this is a rather high estimate,
he argues that it is consistent with data on profit margins and plant costs. Finally, Ro¨ller
and Steen (2005) find a short-run elasticity of 0.46 and a corresponding long-run elasticity
of 1.47 for the Norwegian market. For our calculations, we employ price elasticities of 0.5
(low), 0.8 (best guess) and 2.0 (high).
The common standard of measurement for carbon emissions intensities in cement produc-
tion is kilograms of CO2 per ton of Portland cement equivalent (tPCE). Emissions intensities
are driven by a combination of factors, including plant size, plant age, processing technology
and fuel mix. The British Cement Association stated in its 2006 Performance Report that
its four members had an average emissions intensity of 822 kgCO2/tPCE in 2005, but the
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report does not contain any data for individual firms. We have obtained emissions intensities
for the two largest firms from other sources, but have not been able to do the same for the
other firms in the industry. Lafarge Cement UK, the market leader, reports an emissions
intensity of around 770 kgCO2/tPCE for 2005, while Castle Cement’s emissions intensity
was around 820 kgCO2/tPCE (see Lafarge Cement UK – 2005 Environmental Statement,
and Castle Cement – 2007 Sustainability Report respectively).
We found no indication from cement industry sources of large differences in emissions
intensities across firms. It seems likely that firms in the sector have emissions intensities
within the range 700-940 kgCO2/tPCE, implying that the larger part of the marginal cost
impact of the EU ETS is commonly experienced. Amongst other things, this implies that
the coefficient of variation of emissions intensities (that is, their standard deviation divided
by the average emissions intensity in the industry of around 820 kgCO2/tPCE) is likely to
be no greater than around 0.15. Our evidence, though limited, is also consistent with the
assumption that emissions intensities and market shares are (weakly) negatively correlated.
In any case, it seems unlikely that this correlation coefficient takes on an extreme value on
either the positive or negative side in the UK cement industry.
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